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Listening to today's news, it is impossible not to hear someone
call for immediate health care reform. The uninsured, rising health
care costs, the diabetes epidemic, the financial instability of health
care facilities-these are just some of the issues that have contrib-
uted to what has become a health crisis of epic proportions. Presi-
dential candidates,1 former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer,2 and
even New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn3 have
presented various reform proposals to cover the uninsured and un-
derinsured, expand primary care, and curb inflated health care
costs in an effort to manage this crisis. What is missing from these
proposals, however, is a crucial element that health care policy-
makers have overlooked for far too long: meaningful community
participation in a deliberative process whereby community re-
sidents can influence decisions about their local health care
resources.
The concept of community residents participating fully in a de-
liberative decisionmaking process is hardly new. Legal scholars
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have discussed what has been called a "republican 4 revival" for
over two decades. 5 The modern form of republicanism-what this
Article refers to as "civic republicanism"-stresses the transforma-
tive nature of deliberation as people with diverse interests collec-
tively seek the common good. Thus civic republicanism, with its
emphasis on deliberation and community, is a counterpoint to lib-
eral pluralism, which conceives of society as individuals with com-
peting interests bargaining within the political process.
This Article utilizes the civic republicanism framework to call for
a form of community health planning that incorporates the active
participation of community members in the deliberative process of
allocating health care resources. Like liberal pluralism, the current
health policy model rests upon the competing interests of special
interest groups, such as hospitals and labor unions, as they battle
for leverage within the political process. Yet recent hospital clo-
sures in New York City communities have demonstrated the falli-
bility of excluding community input within this pluralist model. By
failing to consult the people most affected by health policy deci-
sions, the State, as well as health care administrators, makes unin-
formed choices that have proven to be costly for both the
community's health and the financial stability of the health care
system. Thus, no health care reform proposal can succeed without
engaging the public in a meaningful dialogue that learns from com-
munity members' localized knowledge while at the same time em-
powers them to take control of their health care needs.
Part II of this Article provides some background on civic repub-
licanism, drawing heavily from the work of Professor Cass Sun-
stein, whose conception of civic republicanism has four key
principles: deliberation in the public sphere, equality within the de-
liberative process, group consensus towards a common good, and
4. This Article uses the term "republican" in reference to a public philosophy,
not to a particular political affiliation. See Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican
Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1623 n.1 (1988) (noting
"need to distinguish republican thought from the ideology of the party of Ronald
Reagan"). Likewise, the terms "liberalism" and "pluralism" do not connote a politi-
cal preference or a particular celebration of diversity. See, e.g., Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507-08 (1988) ("By 'pluralism' here I don't mean
the acceptance and celebration of diversity within a society."). Rather, liberalism and
pluralism are both political philosophies focused on the individual, as opposed to the
more community-oriented emphasis of republicanism. These political philosophies
will be discussed later in this Article.
5. Symposium, Discovering the Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988).
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the development of the civic virtues of active citizenship.6 These
principles of civic republicanism are further discussed in the con-
text of health care policymaking, particularly regarding the need
for civic participation in community health planning. Part III of
this Article moves the discussion of civic republicanism beyond just
theory by telling the story of four communities in New York City-
Central Brooklyn, Southeast Queens, the Northeast Bronx, and
Southwest Brooklyn-that have endeavored to insert themselves
in the public discourse regarding the possible closure of their re-
spective neighborhood hospitals. By making their voices heard,
these communities have demonstrated that localized knowledge
and concerns are essential features of good government, especially
in an area like health care that so greatly impacts the welfare of the
community. Equally as important, these stories demonstrate the
need for comprehensive, community-based health planning that in-
corporates genuine community participation as part of any success-
ful health care reform.
II. Civic REPUBLICANISM AS A FRAMEWORK
FOR HEALTH PLANNING
It is important to clarify what exactly "civic republicanism"
means as the term is used in this Article. Like many forms of polit-
ical theory, it is subject to various distinctions and possible dis-
agreements among legal scholars.7 But there are general themes of
community, deliberation and the common good which serve as the
foundations of modern republicanism and inform our understand-
ing of political processes as an analytical framework to critique the
failures of the present health care system. Civic republicanism con-
ceives of citizens as part of a larger political community and
stresses the potential of reaching consensus for the common good
through deliberation, rather than competition among independent
and isolated actors within the political process. 8 The contrast be-
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1549-
56 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviv-
ing?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1989) ("The republicanism that is currently being
revived is also difficult to define."); Cynthia Ward, The Limits of 'Liberal Republican-
ism': Why Group-based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 581, 584 (1991) ("Republican theories have varied so widely that discussing
republicanism in the contemporary context, without multiple qualifications, is a seri-
ous problem.").
8. Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
679, 680 (1992).
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tween the "community" and the "individual" is particularly helpful
when discussing health care, which currently suffers from a more
market-based emphasis on competition among individual self-in-
terests. Indeed, it would be difficult to think of a more "common
good" than a community's health and health care, rendering
civic republicanism especially apropos to this area of public
decisionmaking.
A. Background on Civic Republicanism
What has been coined the "republican revival" is a response by
some legal scholars to the over-emphasis of liberal and pluralist
ideals in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Liberal theory consid-
ers the individual to be the "ultimate concern of moral and political
justice," and thus focuses on the individual's desires as the engine
of political activity. 9 Drawing upon liberal theory, pluralism like-
wise emphasizes the primacy of the individual in the political
sphere as conflicting interests compete with each other.10 As a
consequence, pluralism has little faith in the capacity of people
with diverse interests to deliberate collectively towards a common
goal. Instead, pluralism conceives of individuals utilizing "decep-
tion, coercion, or other manipulation" in their interactions with
each other within the political process.11 As a consequence, plural-
ists consider politics to be nothing more than a "market-like me-
dium" navigated by competing individuals who seek to satisfy their
own private interests.12
Dissatisfied with the shortcomings of liberal pluralism's individu-
alistic and market-based approach towards political participation,13
republican theorists have challenged the "hegemony" of liberal as-
sumptions and pluralist ideals in American political culture.14 The
efficacy of connecting civic republicanism to the foundational prin-
ciples of the U.S. Constitution or pronouncing republicanism's su-
periority over the rights-based discourse of liberal pluralism is
beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article utilizes civic
republicanism as a theoretical framework to critique the exclusion
9. Fallon, supra note 7, at 1700 (discussing Tushnet).
10. Feldman, supra note 8, at 679.
11. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1507-08; see also Feldman, supra note 8, at 685-86.
12. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1508; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1542;
Ward, supra note 7, at 591.
13. Feldman, supra note 8, at 680.
14. Id. at 680, 683. At least one scholar has commented that modern republican-
ism "often functions more as a counter-ideology to liberalism than as a philosophy
that is fully developed in its own terms." Fallon, supra note 7, at 1700-01.
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of community participation in decisions concerning the allocation
of health care resources. Of particular insight is Professor Sun-
stein's theory of republicanism and its four main principles: delib-
eration in politics, equality of political actors, universalism or a
common good, and citizenship.1 5 Each of these principles supports
the argument that community participation in political decision-
making, in this case health care policy, is necessary for an effective
democracy and the judicious allocation of health care resources.
Civic republicanism's emphasis on open dialogue and delibera-
tion presupposes that policymakers cannot know what is best for
the community. 16 Thus, according to Professor Sunstein, the re-
quirement for deliberation should not be "purely formal" nor
should politically powerful groups be allowed to impose outcomes
onto the deliberative process.'7 Rather, in believing in the trans-
formative potential of deliberation, civic republicanism requires
exposure to as many diverse interests as possible, which are then
subject to scrutiny and revision based on the multiple perspectives
that contribute to and are borne from the interactive discussions. 18
The ideal of civic republicanism, therefore, "is not initial agree-
ment on substantive issues, but belief in the consensual possibilities
of deliberative dialogue."' 9 Moreover, the potential for consensus
is less dependent on "identical conceptions of the good," but in-
stead depends on the faith that interaction that is truly open and
free among individuals will eventually lead to a common under-
standing.2" Consensus in this manner benefits from the process of
vetting decisions through multiple perspectives, which is a "mea-
sure of the legitimacy of government action."'"
15. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1539. The term "citizenship" is not limited to its
formal meaning under immigration law. Such a construction would, for example, ex-
clude immigrants from a public dialogue on immigrant health, rendering it antithetical
to the need for deliberation among diverse interests under republican theory. In-
stead, a "civic republican conception of citizenship supposes that people must be en-
gaged in framing the rules and administering the institutions that govern all aspects of
their communal lives." Brest, supra note 4, at 1626. Citizenship, therefore, is inti-
mately connected to membership of a community and "does not occur solely through
official organs." Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1573. Indeed, "[m]any organizations-
including labor unions, religious associations, women's groups of various sorts, civil
rights organizations, volunteer and charitable groups, and others... -serve as outlets
for some of the principle functions of republican systems." Id.
16. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 1701; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1574-75.
17. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1551.
18. Id. at 1549; see also Michelman, supra note 4, at 1504.
19. Ward, supra note 7, at 584-85; see also Feldman, supra note 8, at 697.
20. Ward, supra note 7, at 585.
21. Fallon, supra note 7, at 1732 (discussing Sunstein).
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A prerequisite for true deliberation-representing the wide ar-
ray of interests demanded of civic republicanism-is equal partici-
pation in the deliberative process. Indeed, the integrity of the
deliberative process, as well as the value of subsequent results,
would be wholly undermined by the failure to ensure equal access
to the political process due to disparities in wealth and power.22
Because civic republicanism values the opinions of everyone, re-
gardless of status or power, unequal influences within the political
sphere do not further its goals.2 3 Thus, for Professor Sunstein, ef-
forts to equalize political power, such as proportional representa-
tion, are more justified on republican bases because the
deliberative process thrives on the inclusion of multiple voices, es-
pecially the voices of disadvantaged groups that may have less ac-
cess to the process.24 Furthermore, in contrast to a pluralist model
where diverse interests are viewed as in competition with each
other, republicanism seeks to ensure that certain groups have ac-
cess to the deliberative process. Rather than giving these groups a
"piece of the action," the goal is to examine as many views as pos-
sible in search of the best outcome for everyone.25
The importance of equal participation cannot be overestimated,
especially in light of the United States' history of excluding groups
from civic life based on republican arguments.26 Professor Derrick
Bell, for example, has commented on the natural skepticism of Af-
rican-Americans to revive a political theory that had defined the
"common good" as the "common good of whites" and upheld the
hypocrisy of civic participation in the context of the de jure and de
facto exclusion of African-Americans from public life.27 Even Pro-
fessor Sunstein has noted the irony of invoking republicanism,
which had "traditionally been allied with exclusionary practices,"
22. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1552.
23. Brest, supra note 4, at 1626-27.
24. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1588.
25. Id.
26. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 695 ("The concept of an objective common good
led to elitist and conservative strains in the framers' constitutional thought" whereby
"certain individuals" are considered "more capable than others of perceiving the true
interests of the people-the objective common good ... [and that] some groups of
people-namely, women and African-American slaves-are so incapable of perceiv-
ing the public good that they can be justifiably excluded from the deliberations within
the political community."); Ward, supra note 7, at 587 ("Historically, republicans re-
lied on political exclusion-the restriction of citizenship to those sharing class, gender,
and racial backgrounds-to ensure the kind of connectedness necessary to avoid divi-
sive battles and secure general political agreement.").
27. Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609, 1610-12 (1988).
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in order to reject those very same practices.2 8 Nevertheless, Sun-
stein argues that the value of republican theory is its ability to cri-
tique its own implementation. 29  The key, however, is the
foundational principles of civic republicanism that require the
equality of political actors during the deliberative process. In order
to foster true diversity of perspectives, there must be more than
mere formal equality; there must be an affirmative effort to include
voices that are more likely to be silenced due to racial, economic,
or other forms of injustice. 3° For this purpose, Professor Mari Mat-
suda's method of "looking to the bottom" is particularly instruc-
tive. According to Professor Matsuda, the "technique of imagining
oneself black and poor in some hypothetical world is less effective
than studying the actual experience of black poverty and listening
to those who have done so. ''31 Likewise, it is imperative for policy-
makers, especially health policymakers, to listen to the voices of
those most marginalized within the political system and ensure that
their concerns inform policy decisions in a meaningful way.
Deliberation is only productive if it will lead to some form of
consensus. As a consequence, the "common good"-or what Pro-
fessor Sunstein calls "universalism"-is an underlying supposition
of what can be achieved through civic republicanism. The concept
of "universalism" is simply a belief in the power of discussion and
dialogue in mediating differences, including different notions of the
common good.32 The common good, therefore, is an unknowable
concept that can only be revealed to a certain extent at the end of
an inclusive and functional deliberative process.33 Consequently,
the mutual respect necessary for successful mediation is intimately
connected to civic republicanism's view of individuals as members
of a larger community. The community is "consciously and jointly
28. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1581.
29. Id. ("[T]he premises of republican thought furnish an aspiration that turns out
to provide the basis for criticism of republican traditions.").
30. On this issue, I disagree with Ward's contention that civic republicanism is
inconsistent with group-based remedies. See Ward, supra note 7, at 583. In her analy-
sis of Professor Sunstein's version of civic republicanism, she does not sufficiently
address his "equality principle" and the need for group-based remedies if that group
is excluded from the deliberative process due to systemic reasons, such as institution-
alized racism.
31. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987); see also Stephen M. Feldman,
Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835 (1992)
(arguing that civic republicanism is the best approach to reduce racism).
32. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1554.
33. Id.
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shaping its polity [and] its way of life" 34 as members interact with
and learn from each other through their deliberation in the public
sphere.
During the course of deliberation, participants seek what is best
for the community at large, not the satisfaction of their own per-
sonal interests. 36 Thus, the very act of deliberating for the common
good, as opposed to one's self-interest, promotes citizenship and
helps develop the civic virtues of empathy and community. 37 By
placing a "high premium on citizenship and participation," civic re-
publicanism also facilitates "decentralization, local control, and lo-
cal self-determination, "38 and advances an active self-government
that cultivates "knowledge of public affairs, a sense of belonging, a
concern for the whole, and a moral bond with the community
whose fate is at stake."3 9 In essence, civic republicanism is a "com-
mitment to self-government by citizens conceived of as equals" as
they control their own political fate and the well-being of their
community.40 Active participation in the political community,
therefore, results in both good government and good citizens, for
the benefit of everyone.
B. Civic Participation in Community Health Planning
The civic republican principles of deliberation, equality, the com-
mon good, and citizenship all support the active participation of
community members in community health planning. Indeed,
health policy experts and legal scholars have long advocated
greater community participation in health care decisionmaking.
The key, however, is the form of that community participation and
whether it truly entails equal access to meaningful deliberation.
Much of the literature discussing community involvement in
health policymaking uses language strikingly similar to that of civic
republicanism. Equal access to and participation in the delibera-
tive process, a key feature of civic republicanism, is considered an
essential component of health policymaking because it legitimizes
34. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1504.
35. See Brest, supra note 4, at 1623; Fallon, supra note 7, at 1700.
36. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1550; see also Feldman, supra note 8, at 679.
37. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1556.
38. Id. at 1555-56.
39. Michael Sandel, Keynote Address: Democracy's Discontent: America in
Search of a Public Philosophy, 85 GEO. L.J. 2074 (1997).
40. Fallon, supra note 7, at 1725. Professor Michelman calls this a "jurisgenera-
tive" political process, or one that is "capable of imbuing its legislative product with a
'sense of validity' as 'our' law." Michelman, supra note 4, at 1502.
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decisions, rendering them more acceptable to the public." This le-
gitimacy is especially important in the area of health care, which "is
deeply ingrained in the American consciousness" as a fundamental
right.42 Because the allocation, or rationing, of health care re-
sources is "fundamentally a moral and political problem," the gov-
ernment must play a role in protecting the public interests at stake
in health care policy, especially for the more vulnerable members
in the community. 43 As a consequence, what may seem to be "ob-
jective approaches to health care cost containment," such as the
closure or downsizing of hospitals, necessarily invoke questions of
morality and justice that must be resolved in the public sphere by
all those affected.44 The enormity of the public interest at stake
when health care resources are allocated or rationed demands that
decisions be "publicly assessed through a democratic consensus
mechanism" in order to achieve legitimacy as a community driven
decision.45
Broad-based deliberation, moreover, produces more valuable re-
sults because such deliberation incorporates the diverse interests
41. This has been called the "participation hypothesis"-"the generalization that
people are more likely to accept change if the persons who are expected to change
take part in deciding what the change will be and how it will be made." Jack H.
Nagel, Combining Deliberation and Fair Representation in Community Health Deci-
sions, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1973 (1992).
42. In a recent poll conducted by the Opportunity Agenda and Harvard Univer-
sity researchers, eighty-nine percent of New York State residents believed that health
care should be a right for everyone, and seventy percent thought that government
should be "mainly responsible for ensuring that everyone in New York gets the health
care that they need." Press Release, Opportunity Agenda, NEW POLL: 77% of New
Yorkers AGREE Hospital Closures would be BAD for New York's Health Care Sys-
tem (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.opportunityagenda.org/site/c.mwL5KkNOLvH/b.2265
835/k.6558/NYCHealthPollRelease.htm; see also Ezekial J. Emanuel & Linda L.
Emanuel, Preserving Community in Health Care, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 147,
166 (1997).
A 1938 Gallup poll reported that 81 percent of adults nationwide believed
that "government should be responsible for medical care for people who
can't afford it." Fifty-three years later the number was 80%-a remarkably
stable conviction. [And an] annual trend study also shows that more than
three-quarters of the public consistently express the conviction that "access
to health care should be a fundamental right."
Id. (quoting Daniel Yankelovich, The Debate That Wasn't: The Public and the Clinton
Plan, 14 HEALTH AnF. 7-23 (1995)).
43. Leonard M. Fleck, Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Ap-
proach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1599, 1603 (1992). Professor Fleck argues that the
distribution of health care is both a moral matter and a matter of social justice, and
rejects the "claim that health care is simply another commodity properly distributed
in accord with ability to pay." Id. at 1601.
44. Id. at 1611.
45. Id. at 1611, 1617.
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and concerns of people within the health care system. The shift
away from relying primarily on the medical profession in the deci-
sionmaking process reflects a new understanding that technical ex-
pertise is no more valuable in health resource allocation than
information that lay people can provide.46 Even at the treatment
level, providers are recognizing the importance of incorporating
the particular cultural, moral, and lifestyle preferences of a given
patient when determining treatment options.47 Without the active
participation of communities in the deliberative process, health
care allocation decisions would be "beyond the pale of public scru-
tiny or accountability" and subject to the possibility of "capricious,
unreasonable, or dangerous" decisionmaking that lacks the impri-
matur of widespread legitimacy.48
Like civic republicans, health advocates and scholars recognize
deliberation as the "key to consensus," because various stakehold-
ers actively learn about a given situation, listen to others, and share
multiple perspectives. 49 Incorporation of a broad range of commu-
nity input from the very beginning, through a structured and insti-
tutionalized process, allows health care to develop into a political
issue for individuals from all walks of life, as it should be.5" Institu-
tionalized support for community engagement in public discourse
is, in essence, an affirmation of community, which has a "self-rein-
forcing effect when the benefits are produced. '51 This is particu-
larly important in low-income communities, immigrant
communities, and communities of color, which often have exper-
ienced numerous forms of exclusion and disempowerment.
46. Cathy Charles & Suzanne DeMaio, Lay Participation in Health Care Decision
Making: A Conceptual Framework, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 881, 883-84
(1993).
47. Id.
48. Fleck, supra note 43, at 1612.
49. Nagel, supra note 41, at 1972.
50. SYDNEY J. SOCOLAR, VICTOR W. SIDEL, ANNNETrE RAMIREZ DE ARELLANO
& FRANK GOLDSMITH, PUB. HEALTH Ass'N OF N.Y. CITY, STRENGTHENING NEW
YORK CITY'S PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE 13-14 (2001), available at http://
www.phanyc.org/pdfs/NYCphiW2.pdf.
51. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 42, at 174. The "affirmation of community"
parallels civic republicanism's "momentum toward community in order to overcome
separatist drives," as opposed to the pluralist system that "encourages the citizenry to
divide itself into groups in order to win politically controlled benefits." Ward, supra
note 7, at 593, 595-96; see also James Morone & Elizabeth Kilbreth, Power to the
People? Restoring Citizen Participation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 271, 281
(2003) ("Give communities real responsibility over their lives-over the social pro-
grams that directly affect them-and intense, ideological minorities will tend to be
muted by serious democratic deliberations.").
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Through the process of addressing their local health problems,
these communities can develop a grassroots political infrastructure
to engage actively in the improvement of their local health care
system.52
Ultimately, meaningful deliberation in the health care decision-
making process can foster self-government and community em-
powerment-the same objectives advanced by civic republican-
ism's emphasis on the civic virtues of active citizenship. Com-
munities become empowered when they gain "information, skills,
and resources" that facilitate and improve their participation in
public deliberation.53 As new groups become introduced to health
care politics through their involvement in the deliberative process,
the locus of power within the health care system shifts towards the
grassroots level, resulting in a system that is more responsive to the
local health care needs of the community. 54 Thus, once community
empowerment is identified as a priority in health care policymak-
ing, the mechanics of the health care system immediately require
input from community members and rely upon the diversity of
their views through a process that is accessible and understandable
with limitless possibilities of local leadership development. 55 Of
course, participation does not necessarily produce community em-
powerment; there must be a fundamental shift in the power dy-
namics within the health care system for true empowerment to
take place.56
Unfortunately, however, our current health care system makes
little effort to ensure community participation, and instead bears
similarities to the competitive pluralist model that had spurred the
republican revival. Federal deregulation of the health care indus-
try has produced a "mushrooming of for-profit activities in the
health field," evident in insurance companies, HMOs, nursing
52. Morone & Kilbreth, supra note 51, at 287.
53. Pauline Vaillancort Rosenau, Health Politics Meets Post-Modernism: Its Mean-
ing and Implications for Community Health Organizing, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 303, 310 (1994).
54. Morone & Kilbreth, supra note 51, at 272. One study cites to an effort by an
African-American community in Arkansas to assert control over their local health
care: "In overcoming the opposition of local physicians, the county judge, white citi-
zens, county health departments, and pharmacists, the black community has devel-
oped a sense of strength and participation in the political process. Outstanding
leaders and spokes [sic] people for the community have emerged." Emanuel &
Emanuel, supra note 42, at 161.
55. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 42, at 175 (citing STEPHEN M. SHORTELL ET.
AL., REMAKING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: BUILDING ORGANIZED DELIVERY SYS-
TEMS 6 (1996)).
56. Charles & DeMaio, supra note 46, at 900.
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homes, ambulatory surgery centers, and the like .5  At the same
time, uninsured, underinsured, and low-income families suffer
from Medicaid cutbacks and the deterioration of their health care
safety net. With the current emphasis on profit comes a "corporate
style of planning" that focuses on maximizing profitable services
regardless of actual health needs.58 As a result, the health care sys-
tem has replaced community health planning, which focused on the
needs of the community regardless of profit, with corporate "stra-
tegic planning," which focuses on the market potential of health
services determined primarily by profit.
59
Likewise, the limited amount of health planning in New York
City primarily takes place in the private sector, where each health
care institution has a separate goal of "maximizing profits and
averting risks."6 Instead, New York City needs a "uniform, trans-
parent, participatory process" for allocating health care resources,
including the termination of services from hospital closures.61 In
the aftermath of health care deregulation, public intervention in
health planning and coordination is needed now more than ever in
order to ensure equal access to quality services.62 The rationale
behind health planning has always been the effective use of re-
sources-in other words, health planning seeks to "do more with
less."63 An equally important rationale, however, is the provision
of sufficient and quality health services in underserved areas pursu-
ant to "equitable principles of distributive justice. ' 64 This under-
standing comports with traditional beliefs that health care should
not be a "market commodity" or "part of a business transaction,"
57. Herbert H. Hyman, Reagan's Impact on Health Planning, 4 J. PLAN. LITERA-
TURE 259, 265 (1989).
58. Id. at 266.
59. Id. In her analysis of Health Systems Agencies, which will be discussed later
in this Article, Professor Sofaer notes the "substantial purchasing power" of "major
institutions such as business, labor unions, and government." Shoshanna Sofaer, Com-
munity Health Planning in the United States: A Postmortem, FAM. CMTY. HEALTH,
Feb. 1988, at 1, 10. She also cautions, however, that "[p]urchasers are concerned,
ultimately, with the 'bottom line.' Many care about quality and health status, both as
values in themselves and because poor quality and poor health status can be costly.
But their primary concern is not overall community health but the health status and
health care utilization of the defined population for whom they are buying health
benefits." Id. at 10-11.
60. SOCOLAR ET AL-, supra note 50, at 9.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Bruce C. Vladeck, Interest-group Representation and the HSAs: Health Plan-
ning and Political Theory, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 23, 26 (1977) (emphasis added).
64. James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation
Through Certificate of Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3, 6 (1978).
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but rather made available to everyone as a necessary component of
a productive and successful life.65
Health planning, therefore, has two complementary goals: to al-
locate health resources in a more efficient manner and to improve
the delivery of health services in underserved areas.66 Yet in order
to achieve both purposes jointly, health planning must include
equal access to a meaningful, deliberative, and consensus building
process that is independent from market-based, competitive influ-
ences, amounting to an explicit rejection of the pluralist model. In-
deed, civic republicanism's critique of pluralism is insightful on this
point: while pluralism conceives of government's role as facilitating
the "satisfaction of private interests," such as increased profits in
health care, republicanism believes government should aid the
"pursuit of the common good," such as health services to under-
served and disadvantaged groups. 67 Moreover, because civic re-
publicanism deals directly with "economic and political
inequality," it recognizes the need for government to play an active
role in ensuring the successful implementation of a truly par-
ticipatory deliberative process.68
The Federal Government's most recent effort to promote par-
ticipatory democracy in the health care arena took the form of the
Health Systems Agencies ("HSAs"), which were created by the
Federal National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 197469 ("Planning Act") and subsequent state law.7° Under
the Planning Act, HSAs could serve as a "public regional planning
body" or a "unit of general local government" charged with the
responsibility of developing and implementing system-wide health
plans.71 An innovative and controversial feature of the Planning
Act was the requirement that a majority of the HSA governing
body consist of "consumers of health care and who are not . * *
providers of health care and who are broadly representative of the
social economic, linguistic and racial populations, geographic areas
65. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 42, at 165.
66. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 64, at 7.
67. Feldman, supra note 8, at 697.
68. Brest, supra note 4, at 1623; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1574
("[M]ultiple threats are posed by private power, including that wielded by intermedi-
ate organizations, which are themselves a source of oppression. Government must
therefore play a role in limiting the powers of such organizations without denying the
importance of their continued existence.").
69. National Health Planning & Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975).
70. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2904-b (Consol. 2007).
71. National Health Planning & Resources Development Act § 1512.
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of the health service area, and major purchasers of health care."72
According to at least one scholar, this requirement "finally eclipsed
the role of physicians as the unchallenged leaders of the [health
care] system. 73
The functions of the HSA included collecting and analyzing data,
developing and implementing health plans, reviewing health care
facility expansions, and reviewing applications for certain federal
funds.7 ' The HSA's only real authority over health care institu-
tions like hospitals, however, was the approval or disapproval of
certain federally funded projects that made up only about ten per-
cent of federal health expenditures. 75 Thus, although HSAs had a
"quasi-regulatory" role in reviewing certain health-related projects,
they mostly served as advisors to state and federal agencies, which
had the ultimate authority to make policy decisions.76 As one
scholar commented, "planning without authority to implement
goals is merely an exercise in fantasy land decision-making. 77
Another criticism of the HSAs was the actual functioning of the
governing board that was supposed to represent a broad range of
community interests. Though this may have been an initial attempt
at participatory democracy in the same vein as civic republicanism,
the reality was quite different. Despite the statutory requirement
for a consumer majority, HSAs were often still controlled by prov-
iders that traditionally held power in health policy. 78 Moreover,
the mandate for broad representation on the HSAs' governing
72. Id. § 1512(b)(3)(C)(i). New York's statute required that a "majority of mem-
bers ... be residents of the health service region served by the agency who are con-
sumers of health care and major purchasers of health care, including labor
organizations and business corporations, in the region." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2904-b(4)(a). The state regulations, however, required that the majority be:
(i) residents of the health service area served by the agency who are consum-
ers of health care, and (ii) broadly representative of the health service area
and shall include individuals representing the principal social, linguistic,
handicapped, ethnic and racial populations and geographic areas of the
health service area and major purchasers of health care, including labor or-
ganizations and business corporations, in the area.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 10, § 82-1.5(c)(1) (2007).
73. Mark A. Peterson, Introduction: Who Shall Lead?, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 181, 183 (2003).
74. Sofaer, supra note 59, at 4.
75. Vladeck, supra note 63, at 24.
76. Sofaer, supra note 59, at 4; see also Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 64, at 17
n.108 ("With respect to the roles of the Health Systems Agencies in achieving their
established targets, it is clear that their current authority is limited." (quoting 43 Fed.
Reg. 3056, 3058 (Jan. 20, 1978))).
77. Hyman, supra note 57, at 263.
78. Id. at 262.
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boards was often reduced to a superficial effort to maintain quotas
in satisfaction of the statutory requirements.79 By specifying the
formal composition of an HSA's governing body, rather than en-
suring equal access to the deliberative process, Congress failed to
ensure that HSAs would be accountable to the public-at-large in-
stead of "more narrowly-based interest groups." 80 The New York
City HSA, for example, was dominated by the interests of private
medical care institutions, which in turn relied upon the market to
determine health needs that were not reflective of the larger com-
munity. 81 Unless HSAs gain credibility through responsiveness to
local concerns, they can never have the legitimacy to enact the
sometimes controversial changes required by comprehensive
planning.82
Nevertheless, when New York City lost its HSA in 1996, it also
experienced a total collapse of health planning. 3 Currently, New
York City has no long-term vision for the city's health care system
that includes the planning elements of "goals, priorities, time
frame, strategies and resource commitment. '84 Despite its flaws,
the loss of the New York City HSA took with it some very impor-
tant functions, such as vetting hospitals' capital projects and pro-
posed service changes and serving as a repository for health data
and analysis. 85 There is also presently no collection or analysis of
"health indicators broken down by ethnicity, gender, age group,
geography, disease category, and type of services used" that would
identify disparities and inequities, which is a necessary first step
before attempting to remedy them.86 In the republican tradition,
this type of data had previously been used by community groups to
support their positions during deliberations on health care policy.
In effect, the data facilitated their participation in policymaking,
thereby engendering a demand for access to even more informa-
tion.87
One could argue that the failure of the HSAs goes hand-in-hand
with their nonconformity with civic republican principles. A re-
publican approach would have demanded that community mem-
79. Sofaer, supra note 59, at 5-6.
80. Vladeck, supra note 63, at 28.
81. SOCOLAR ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.
82. Sofaer, supra note 59, at 9.
83. SOCOLAR ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.





bers have more authority over and participation in the deliberative
process. Such an approach would have also emphasized consensus
building for the good of the entire community rather than competi-
tion among special interest groups. Without broad-based delibera-
tion and consensus, there can be no broad-based community
support for potentially controversial decisions regarding health
care allocation. This lack of support undermines the credibility of
the decisions and the decisionmaking process themselves. In order
for any community health planning to succeed, all of these issues-
deliberation, participation, community, and accountability-must
be taken seriously.
IH. HOSPITAL DISINVESTMENT IN THE ABSENCE
OF HEALTH PLANNING
In the decade since New York City lost its HSA, there has been
no comprehensive, long-term health planning to determine the al-
location of health care resources and no form of meaningful com-
munity participation in health policy decisionmaking. The results
have been disastrous, causing further retrenchment of alarming
levels of health disparities and the costly and inefficient use of vital
health care dollars. As members of the New York City Council
aptly noted:
The health care system in the United States has reached a crisis
point, and nowhere more so than in New York City.... [T]he
health care infrastructure in the City fails to work effectively as
a whole. A system-wide lack of planning has led to tremendous
inequities in service delivery. Services offered by different prov-
iders are poorly coordinated and far too many New Yorkers do
not have access to appropriate services. Additionally, while
many communities are significantly underserved, other commu-
nities have too many facilities. 8
There is no better example of the failures of New York City's
health care system-both in terms of the lack of health planning
and the exclusion of community participation-than the closure of
hospitals in New York City's medically underserved areas, which
are often immigrant communities or communities of color. With-
out comprehensive health planning, hospitals have been left to
their own devices in a competitive, profit-seeking mode consistent
with the pluralist model. Instead of working with community
88. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, A PRESCRIPTION FOR NEW YORK CITY'S HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL HOSPITAL CLOSING
TASK FORCE 1 (Nov. 2006).
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members to serve their neighborhoods better, hospitals have been
forced to fight for their own financial survival.89 In the meantime,
New York City has witnessed the closure of twelve hospitals in the
past decade-two-thirds of which predominantly served people of
color.90 For some of these closed hospitals, more than ninety per-
cent of their patients were African-American, Latino, and Asian.91
In order to illustrate the disconnect between health care re-
sources and health care needs in the absence of health planning,
this Article discusses two major events that have negatively im-
pacted New York City's health care system: the bankruptcy of the
St. Vincent's Catholic Medical Centers ("St. Vincent's") and the
hospital closing recommendations of the Commission on Health
Care Facilities in the 21st Century ("Berger Commission"). 92 Both
events resulted in the disinvestment of health care resources in
medically underserved areas and, just as importantly, excluded af-
fected community members from the decisionmaking process. This
is a story of four communities in Central Brooklyn, Southeast
Queens, the Northeast Bronx, and Southwest Brooklyn, and their
battle with government officials and health care institutions to pre-
serve their local health care.
A. St. Vincent's' Bankruptcy
The St. Vincent's network claimed to be "one of the New York
metropolitan area's most comprehensive healthcare system" and
"the largest provider of emergency medical services in the New
89. According to the Healthcare Association of New York State, "New York hos-
pitals lost money providing patient care.., every year in the seven-year period 1998
through 2004," amounting to losses of $127 million in 2004 and cumulative losses of
up to $2.3 billion since 1998. HEALTHCARE Ass'N OF N.Y. STATE, HOSPITALS ON
LIFE SUPPORT: SEVEN STRAIGHT YEARS OF LOSSES 2 (Jan. 2006).
90. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, DANGEROUS AND UNLAWFUL: WHY OUR
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM Is FAILING NEW YORK COMMUNITIES AND How To Fix IT 6
(2007) [hereinafter DANGEROUS AND UNLAWFUL]. The disproportionate impact of
these hospital closures on communities of color potentially violates regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit hospitals
from utilizing "criteria or methods of administration that would have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin
.... " 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, this claim can-
not be tested in court because the U.S. Supreme Court has found no private right of
action to enforce these regulations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
91. DANGEROUS AND UNLAWFUL, supra note 90, at 3.
92. COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, A PLAN TO
STABILIZE AND STRENGTHEN NEW YORK'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Dec. 2006) [here-
inafter BERGER COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.nyhealthcarecommis-
sion.org/docs/final/commissionfinalreport.pdf. The term "Berger Commission" is
derived from the name of the commission's chair, Stephen Berger.
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York City's Fire Department's 911 service. ... "93 When it filed for
bankruptcy in July 2005, St. Vincent's had seven hospitals with
2500 affiliated physicians and employed 12,500 full or part-time
employees in the New York City area. 94 In 2004 alone, the net-
work had "600,000 outpatient visits, 640,000 home care visits and
92,000 inpatient discharges." 95 Needless to say, any decisions to
close or downsize the network's hospitals would have a tremen-
dous impact on New York City's health care system.
Yet, despite the obvious connection between the health services
provided by St. Vincent's and the health of the communities that
relied on those services, there was no formal process by which
community members could voice their concerns and inform health
administrators and public officials about how best to handle St.
Vincent's financial constraints. Over the course of its bankruptcy,
St. Vincent's divested itself of all its acute-care hospitals, except its
flagship hospital in Greenwich Village.96 St. Vincent's reasons for
closing or selling its hospitals were never based on the health needs
of the community, but rather the hospitals' profitability. 97 Mean-
while, St. Vincent's incurred over $14 million in legal fees during its
two and a half years in bankruptcy 98 and currently plans on under-
93. Debtor's Motion for (A) an Order Approving (i) Bidding Procedures with
Respect to the Sale of Mary Immaculate Hospital and St. John's Queens Hospital,
and Related Assets, (ii) the Time, Date, Place, and Form of Notice for Each of the
Auction and Sale Hearing, and (iii) a Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement
and (B) an Order Approving (i) the Sale of the Hospitals and Related Assets Free
and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Other Interests, and (ii) the Assump-
tion and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases 2, In re Saint
Vincent's Catholic Med. Ctrs. of New York et al., No. 05-14945 (ASH) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006).
94. Id. $ 2-3.
95. Id. 2.
96. Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Hospital to Exit Bankruptcy, Promising to Pay Back
Debts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, at B2.
97. In one of its bankruptcy submissions, St. Vincent's stated that:
Several of [St. Vincent's] hospitals have been unprofitable for many years
.... Because [St. Vincent's] cannot afford to operate [these hospitals], have
been unable to improve significantly the operating performance of these
hospitals, and do not have the financial resources to fund the required capi-
tal improvements at these hospitals, [St. Vincent's] determined that they
must divest themselves of these hospitals in order to reorganize successfully
and continue as a going concern.
MIH Bidding Motion, supra note 94, $$ 5-6; see also Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Chain of
Catholic Hospitals Puts Three Units on the Market, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at B3
("'These hospitals need major investments to modernize and stay competitive, and we
don't have the resources to make those investments,' said Bernadette Kingham-Bez, a
senior vice president of the St. Vincent network.").
98. Elizabeth Solomont, St. Vincent's Emerging from "Daunting" Bankruptcy,
N.Y. SUN, July 31, 2007, at 4.
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going an $800 million reconstruction of its Greenwich Village
hospital.99
Two communities of color, Central Brooklyn and Southeast
Queens (Jamaica), were especially impacted by St. Vincent's di-
vestment plan. Both communities suffer from some of the worst
health care outcomes in the city, and both have been designated by
the Federal Government as a "Medically Underserved Area '' "°
and a "Health Professional Shortage Area" since 1993.101 A com-
parison of the health and racial demographics, in Table 1 below, of
Greenwich Village against Central Brooklyn and Southeast
Queens, further illustrates how St. Vincent's decisions were driven
by finances, not community health needs. For example, Central
Brooklyn-with a population that is eighty percent black, com-
pared to three percent in Greenwich Village-has an infant mortal-
ity rate that is more than quadruple the rate in Greenwich Village.
Additionally, the percentage of adults with diabetes in both Cen-
tral Brooklyn and Jamaica, Queens is more than double the per-
centage in Greenwich Village. These are just some of the examples
of the health disparities among these communities.
99. John Freeman Gill, On Vigilant Streets, a Closely Watched Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2007, at 14CY.
100. This designation requires the consideration of four variables: (i) "ratio of pri-
mary care medical physicians per 1,000 population;" (ii) "infant mortality rate;" (iii)
"percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level;" and (iv) "per-
centage of population age 65 or over." Bureau of Health Professions, U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Guidelines for Medically Underserved Area and Population
Designation, http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/muaguide.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
The Central Brooklyn neighborhoods of Crown Heights and Bedford-Stuyvesant and
South Jamaica in Southeast Queens have all been designated "Medically Underserved
Areas" since 1993. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Medically Underserved Areas / Medically Underserved Populations (MUA/
MUP), http://muafind.hrsa.gov (choose "NY" from state drop down menu, control
click "Kings County" and "Queens County," then click "Find MVA/MVPs" hyper-
link) (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
101. In making such a designation, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services looks at (i) whether the "area is a rational area for the delivery of primary
medical care services;" (ii) the ratio of full-time, primary care physicians to the popu-
lation; and (iii) whether "[p]rimary medical care professionals in contiguous areas are
overutilized, excessively distant, or inaccessible to the population of the area under
consideration." U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Bureau of Health Professions,
Health Professional Shortage Area Primary Medical Care Designation Criteria, http://
bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/hpsacritpcm.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). Other than the
Central Brooklyn neighborhoods of East New York, Crown Heights, Bushwick, and
Bedford-Stuyvesant and South Jamaica in Queens, the only other "Health Profes-
sional Shortage Areas" in New York City are Port Richmond and St. George in
Staten Island, Long Island City in Queens, Washington Heights-Inwood and West
Central Harlem in Manhattan, Williamsburg in Brooklyn, and Hunts Point-Mott Ha-
ven and Highbridge in the Bronx. DANGEROUS AND UNLAWFUL, supra note 90, at 5.
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TABLE 1
GREENWICH
VILLAGE & CENTRAL JAMAICA,
SoHo1 02  BROOKLYN 1 0 3  QUEENS1 0 4  NYC
WHITE RESIDENTS 67% 5% 33% 35%
BLACK RESIDENTS 3% 80% 60% 24%
HISPANIC RESIDENTS 6% 11% 15% 27%
RESIDENTS LIVING
BELOW POVERTY
LEVEL 13% 31% 16% 21%
INFANT MORTALITY
RATE 10 5  2 9 7 6
ADULTS USING ER
FOR HEALTH CARE 1% 13% 9% 8%
ADULTS WITH
DIABETES 5% 12% 11% 9%
Due to their reliance on hospital emergency rooms, residents of
Central Brooklyn and Jamaica, Queens are particularly vulnerable
to the loss of hospital services, which are often their only source of
health care. Nevertheless, St. Vincent's cost-benefit analysis
clearly persuaded the network to get out of the unprofitable busi-
ness of providing health care to poor, medically underserved com-
munities of color. 10 6
102. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,
COMMUNITY HEALTH PROFILES: GREENWICH VILLAGE AND SoHo (2d ed. 2006).
103. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,
COMMUNITY HEALTH PROFILES: CENTRAL BROOKLYN (2d ed. 2006).
104. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,
COMMUNITY HEALTH PROFILES: JAMAICA (2d ed. 2006).
105. "Infant mortality rate" is the number of babies who die in the first year per
1,000 live births.
106. One news article made a pointed comparison between St. Mary's Hospital in
Central Brooklyn and St. Vincent's flagship hospital in Greenwich Village:
St. Mary's... which in its 123-year history has cared for the uninsured, poor
and working class of Crown Heights and its surrounding neighborhoods, is in
need of state aid or it faces closure come September. A borough away in
Manhattan, St. Vincent's on West 12th Street is on the verge of opening a
new, state-of-the-art trauma center next month. Both hospitals are traveling
in opposite directions despite being owned and managed by the embattled
Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers ....
Curtis L. Taylor, Same Hospital System, Different Paths, NEWSDAY, July 7, 2005, at
A49.
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1. Closure of St. Mary's Hospital in Central Brooklyn
The New York City HSA's last report in 1993 designated the
Central Brooklyn neighborhoods of Crown Heights, Bedford-Stuy-
vesant, and East New York/Brownsville as three of only ten "Prior-
ity 1" neighborhoods, defined as areas "with the most severe
health-related problems" that should have the "highest priority for
the funding of resource development programs .... 17 Over a
decade later, Central Brooklyn's health has become even worse. 10 8
Compared to New York City overall, adults in Central Brooklyn
have a twenty percent higher rate of heart disease hospitalizations,
more than twice the rate of HIV-related deaths, a thirty-five per-
cent higher rate of mental illness hospitalizations, a more than sev-
enty percent higher rate of alcohol-related hospitalizations, a sixty
percent higher rate of drug-related deaths, a twenty-five percent
higher rate of deaths from cancer, and a sixty-six percent higher
rate of asthma-related hospitalizations. 10 9 Among all of New York
City's neighborhoods, "Central Brooklyn had the highest rate of
newly diagnosed chlamydia in 2004, more than twice the New York
City overall rate. This community also had the second highest rate
of newly diagnosed gonorrhea, almost triple the NYC rate."'110
This was the backdrop of St. Vincent's plan to close St. Mary's
Hospital in Central Brooklyn in 2005. New York Lawyers for the
Public Interest ("NYLPI") represented a coalition of local re-
sidents, churches, and community-based organizations, called the
Committee to Save Our Hospitals ("CSOH"), 11' in an effort to
107. HEALTH SYSTEMS AGENCY (HSA) OF N.Y. CITY, A FRAMEWORK FOR PRI-
MARY CARE NEEDS ANALYSIS IN NEW YORK CITY ii, iv (Sept. 1993).
108. According to the City Department of Health, the hospitalization rate for heart
disease increased by over twenty-five percent in the past decade. HEALTH PROFILES:
CENTRAL BROOKLYN, supra note 103, at 6.
109. Id. at 6, 8-11, 13.
110. Id. at 14.
111. Members of the CSOH included the Brooklyn Council of Churches, Berean
Community and Family Life Center, Greater Rugged Cross Baptist Church, Greater
Friendship Baptist Church, Flatbush Reformed Church, Revival Hour Baptist
Church, Church of God Seventh Day Pentecostal Church, Universal Church of God,
Bethel Evangelical Church, St. Mark's Baptist Church, St. George's Episcopal
Church, Shiloh Baptist Church, Concord Baptist Church, Mt. Paran Baptist Church,
Mt. Sinai Baptist Church, United Baptist Church, Brooklyn Perinatal Network,
Ocean-Hill Brownsville Tenants Association, Community Action Project, Caribbean
Women's Health Association, Riggins Cultural Oasis, and the Task Force on Infant
and Maternal Mortality and Family Health. See Press Release, Committee to Save
Our Hospitals, Enough is Enough! Community Residents, Religious and Community
Leaders and Hospital Employees Voice Concerns at City Council Hearing; Central
Brooklyn Losing Vital Medical Services (June 15, 2005) (on file with the author).
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prevent what would amount to a health care catastrophe. Al-
though the closure of St. Mary's required the approval of the State
Department of Health, there was no formal mechanism for con-
cerned residents and organizations to participate in the process of
determining St. Mary's' future. As a consequence, CSOH had to
take an activist stance and insert itself into the public debate by
convening a "Call to Action Forum, 112 organizing a rally to pro-
test the hospital closure, 1 3 and testifying at a City Council Health
Committee hearing.114
Despite overwhelming community protest and public knowledge
of Central Brooklyn's health status, St. Vincent's decided to close
St. Mary's Hospital when the State refused to provide the funds
necessary for a sale to an interested buyer."1 5 In a final effort to
stop the hospital closure, NYLPI filed a lawsuit on behalf of CSOH
member, Harriet McCloud. McCloud was a fifty-six-year old wo-
man with multiple disabilities and illnesses including diabetes, hy-
pertension, kidney failure, poor circulation, and heart disease, who
relied on St. Mary's for all of her health care needs." 6 McCloud
based her claim on the New York Public Health Law, which re-
quires the State Department of Health to conduct a needs assess-
ment, determine whether patients would have alternative sites for
health services, and allow the public to participate in the decision-
making process before closing a hospital.1 7
The state court initially granted a temporary restraining order, 1 8
but eventually ruled that the matter was stayed by St. Vincent's'
112. Press Release, Committee to Save Our Hospitals, Community Forum Draws
Angry Brooklynites Concerned about Threatened Hospital Closures; New Broad-
Based Coalition Fights to Stop Dramatic Loss of Health and Medical Services; Com-
mittee to Save Our Hospitals Targets St. Mary's Hospital and Interfaith Medical
Center (Jan. 20, 2005), http://www.nylpi.org/pub/hospcomm.pdf.
113. Press Release, Committee to Save Our Hospitals, Enough is Enough! Com-
mittee to Save Our Hospitals Demands, Stop Stripping Medical Services to Low In-
come Communities of Color (May 23, 2005), http://nylpi.org/pub/csphrallypress
releasemay232005.pdf.
114. Press Release, Committee to Save Our Hospitals, supra note 111.
115. See Marc Santora, St. Mary's Hospital in Brooklyn Is to Close After Years of
Losses, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at B1; Joyce Shelby, St. Mary's Rescue Bid Is Scut-
tled, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 24, 2005, at S1.
116. Verified Petition $ 8-9, McCloud v. Novello, Index No. 22406/05 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Kings County July 22, 2005).
117. Id. %% 7-10.
118. Order To Show Cause 1, McCloud v. Novello, Index No. 22406/05 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Kings County July 22, 2005); see also Joyce Shelby, Reprieve for Hospital,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 23, 2005.
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bankruptcy.11 9 The state court proceedings, however, were in-
sightful in that it highlighted both the State's and St. Vincent's' in-
terpretation of section 2806(6) of the New York Public Health
Law, which requires the State Department of Health to find
whether it "would be within the public interest" to "suspend, limit,
modify, or revoke a hospital operating certificate" after consider-
ing, inter alia, the public need, the presence of alternative or substi-
tute services, and the level of care and type of services needed by
patients seeking care at the hospital in question.120 Section 2806(6)
further requires the State to inform the public that any finding is
under consideration for at least thirty days before making that
finding and, most importantly, to "take all public comments into
consideration in making such a finding. ' 121 Because the closure of
a hospital would necessarily "modify" a hospital's operating certifi-
cate, McCloud argued that section 2806(6) clearly called for com-
munity input before the State approved a hospital closure. 122
According to the State, however, "[n]either the Public Health
Law nor state regulations require the extensive review process...
for a voluntary surrender. 1 23 In other words, the State believes
that if a hospital chose to voluntarily close-as opposed to an in-
voluntary, state-mandated closure-there is no need to comply
with section 2806(6), including the requirement for public com-
ment.124 Likewise, St. Vincent's argued that section 2806(6) "does
not apply to a voluntary closing of a hospital and surrender of its
operating certificate," and that it was only subject to the require-
ment that it "provide information to patients regarding their ability
to obtain future health services and establish a plan for the storage
and safekeeping of its patients' medical records.' 1 25 Under this
analysis, St. Mary's' closure was not subject to "a public needs
119. Order, McCloud v. Novello, No. 22406/05, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County July
27, 2005).
120. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2806(6)(a) (Consol. 2007).
121. Id. § 2806(6)(b).
122. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law at 11, McCloud v. Novello, Index No.
22406/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County July 26, 2005).
123. Affidavit in Support of Respondent's Cross-Motion To Dismiss the Petition at
7-8, McCloud v. Novello, Index No. 22406/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County July 26,
2005).
124. Id.
125. Affirmation of Lawrence J. Slattery in Support of Motion To Intervene and
Motion To Dismiss the Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction 25-26, McCloud v. Novello, Index No. 22406/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County July 25, 2005).
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analysis or any other 'factors' to be examined by the State before
approving the closure. "126
The state court never resolved these conflicting interpretations
of section 2806(6) due to the bankruptcy stay, but the intention of
both the State and St. Vincent's was clear: neither wanted any com-
munity participation in the State Department of Health's delibera-
tions about whether or not to approve St. Mary's' closure. Indeed,
St. Vincent's went so far as to file its own lawsuit against McCloud,
claiming "willful" violation of the bankruptcy stay and seeking pu-
nitive damages, in addition to actual damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief.127 Seen through the lens of civic republicanism,
the State and St. Vincent's' construction of section 2806(6) is pa-
tently inconsistent with the democratic principles of self-govern-
ment and open participation in the deliberative process. With no
opportunity for public scrutiny, decisions of such immense public
importance as the closure of a community hospital could not bene-
fit from the concerns and expertise of the people most affected by
those decisions.
St. Vincent's eventually closed St. Mary's in October 2005,128 and
over a year later sold the main building to a Manhattan-based firm
for $22 million. 129 Although more than two years have passed,
there has still been no investment in health care in the Central
Brooklyn area to replace services lost from the closure. To the
contrary, Central Brooklyn continues to experience a series of
health care disinvestments, but each loss has been met with commu-
nity activism and unrest as residents battle for control over their
local health care. For example, after the State Department of
Health approved the closure of five centers in the Women, Infants
and Children Program ("WIC"), 130 CSOH was able to save three
of these centers by mobilizing the community and pressuring their
126. Id.
127. Adversary Complaint at 7, Saint Vincent's Catholic Med. Ctrs of N.Y. v.
McCloud, (In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs of New York), No. 05-14945
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2005). The parties later stipulated to an order dismissing
this adversary proceeding. Stipulation and Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding,
Saint Vincent's Catholic Med. Ctrs of N.Y. v. McCloud (In re Saint Vincents Catholic
Med. Ctrs of New York), Case No. 05-2351A (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2006).
128. Jeff Vandam, Lights Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, §14, at 1.
129. Rachel Monahan, St. Mary's Hospital Sold for $22M, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan.
31, 2007, at S8.
130. "WIC is a special supplemental food program that provides nutritious foods,
milk, juice, formula and other items to low income pregnant or breastfeeding women,
infants and children up to age 5." N.Y. State Dep't of Health, WIC Program, Women,
Infants, Children (July 2007), http://www.health.state.ny.us/prevention/nutrition/wic/.
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local elected officials.13 1 More recently, a new coalition called the
Central Brooklyn Health Crisis Coalition ("CBHCC") fought des-
perately to save St. Mary's' former outpatient clinics that had been
transferred to another hospital just two years earlier to escape clo-
sure. 132 By October 2007, four of St. Mary's' outpatient clinics and
the WIC center in a fifth clinic were closed. Yet, the battle is far
from over; NYLPI is currently working with CBHCC in additional
efforts to bring health care resources into Central Brooklyn.
2. Sale of Mary Immaculate Hospital in Southeast Queens
After closing St. Mary's Hospital, St. Vincent's prepared to
divest itself of another hospital in a community of color-Mary Im-
maculate Hospital, located in the Jamaica neighborhood of South-
east Queens. Like Central Brooklyn, Jamaica is a predominately
African-American community with significant health disparities.
According to the City Department of Health, Jamaica's "hospitali-
zation rates for both long-term diabetes complications and lower-
extremity amputation among people with diabetes are higher than
the rates in NYC overall, suggesting inadequate access to health
care among people with diabetes in this community.' 33 For all
neighborhoods in Queens, Jamaica had the second highest asthma
hospitalization rate for children up to age fourteen, and had by far
the highest rate of current self-reported asthma prevalence for
adults ages eighteen and older.13 4 Additionally, the infant mortal-
ity rate for the Jamaica East health district was 10.1 in 2004, com-
pared to the city average of 6.1, nearly doubling in just two
years.135
Also like Central Brooklyn, numerous community groups in Ja-
maica were concerned about the fate of their local hospital during
the St. Vincent's bankruptcy. Although potential buyers had been
identified, there was a fear that a deal would fall through, as it had
with St. Mary's. Harking back to the problems with the pluralist
131. Joyce Shelby, Good News for Moms & Kids as 3 WIC Centers Are Saved, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25, 2006, at 51.
132. See Joyce Shelby, Fight Gears up to Keep Two Health Clinics from Closing,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 5, 2007 at Si; Joyce Shelby, Gloves Off in Fight to Keep Clin-
ics Open, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 25, 2007, at S1; Joyce Shelby, Brownsville Clinics
May See New Life, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2007, at 1.
133. HEALTH PROFILES: JAMAICA, supra note 104, at 14.
134. N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, ASTHMA FACTS: NEW
YORK CITY CHILDHOOD ASTHMA INITIATIVE 16, 30 (2d ed. 2003).
135. Compare N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, SUMMARY OF
VITAL STATISTICS 2004 46 (2005) with N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HY-
GIENE, SUMMARY OF VITAL STATISTICS 2002 36 (2003).
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model, community members were also concerned that a competing
hospital would see Mary Immaculate as a threat and thus seek to
purchase the hospital only to shut it down shortly thereafter. 136
Amidst all of the negotiations among St. Vincent's, interested hos-
pitals, and the State Department of Health, the community was left
completely in the dark-unable to either access information or
provide their own information about the future of Mary Immacu-
late. In order to become an organized voice representing commu-
nity interests, local groups formed a coalition called Southeast
Queens in Support of Health Services ("SQUISH"). 137
As with CSOH, NYLPI represented SQUISH in a multi-
pronged approach to save the hospital from closure. In accordance
with civic republicanism, the goal of SQUISH's efforts was the in-
clusion of diverse community interests and concerns in any deliber-
ation about Mary Immaculate. 138  For example, SQUISH
submitted information about the community's health disparities
and health needs through affidavits of local residents and commu-
nity letters to demonstrate why non-economic factors, such as the
continued operation of the hospital, should be considered when de-
liberating on the appropriate buyer during bankruptcy court pro-
ceedings.139 SQUISH provided similar information to the State
Department of Health, the State Hospital Review and Planning
Council, and the Public Health Council through both a written sub-
mission and oral testimony.14
0
136. This concern was realized in a New York Times article that reported Jamaica
Hospital's interest in purchasing Mary Immaculate. Jamaica Hospital's president was
quoted as saying that "if Mary Immaculate becomes a strong competitor, that could
'put us over the edge."' Richard Pdrez-Pefia, 2 Small Queens Hospitals in a Struggle
for Survival, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at B5. This consideration led "[1]ocal officials
and St. Vincent executives [to] contend that Jamaica would cut services at Mary Im-
maculate." Id.
137. Members of SQUISH included Grace Episcopal Church, Federation of Civic
Associations, Centro Hispano Cuzcatlin, Brinkerhoff Action Association, Jamaica
YMCA, Haitian Americans United for Progress, Inc., Jamaica Neighborhood Center,
and St. Pascal Babylon Parish.
138. Rick Archer, Wyckoff Hts. Purchases Are Approved By Court, QUEENS
CHRON., June 29, 2006 ("[SQUISH's] goal has been to make the court and state au-
thorities aware of the health needs in Jamaica.").
139. Statement of SQUISH in Furtherance of the Debtors' Bidding Procedures
with Respect to the Sale of Mary Immaculate Hospital and St. John's Queens Hospi-
tal, and Related Assets, and in Response to the Official Creditors' Committee's State-
ment and Reservation of Rights with Respect Thereto TT 8-9, In re Saint Vincent's
Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 05-14945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2006).
140. See Letter from Jin Hee Lee, Staff Attorney, N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. Inter-
est, to Julia G. Richards, N.Y. State Dep't of Health (Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with
author); Testimony of Jin Hee Lee before Project Review Committee of State Hospi-
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Without this information, neither the bankruptcy court nor the
state executive bodies would have known, for example, that: within
walking distance of the hospital, the Jamaica YMCA runs a transi-
tional housing program for homeless men and women living with
AIDS, who rely upon Mary Immaculate for treatment of their
mental illness, substance abuse, and AIDS-related illnesses; 41 a
neighborhood near Mary Immaculate was found to be a toxic site
due to contamination from a former dry cleaning storage and dis-
tribution center; 42 and a large Latino community living near Mary
Immaculate would face significant transportation barriers if forced
to seek care at other hospitals.143 These are just a few examples of
significant, localized knowledge that community members bring to
bear in decisions concerning their local health care needs. 4 4
Consistent with the civic republican tradition, SQUISH held a
community forum so that local residents could speak directly with
an executive from the purchasing hospital and engage in a dialogue
about how the hospital and the community could work together for
the benefit of everyone. 45 In the absence of any formal mecha-
nism for community participation, this forum was the only oppor-
tunity for community members to ask questions and voice their
concerns-in other words, to participate in some form of delibera-
tive process. Yet, history has shown that this informal mode of de-
liberation is not enough-there must also be genuine
accountability to the community in order to ensure that mere
words are supported with results. As one SQUISH member com-
mented, "the proof will be in the pudding," and the community will
need to "watch[ ] that pudding very closely for some time. '146 Just
a few months later, that proved to be true. Although the successful
sale of Mary Immaculate Hospital prevented its closure, the new
tal Review and Planning Council, Sept. 21, 2006 [hereinafter Lee Testimony]; Rick
Archer, Going, Going, Gone: Wyckoff Gets Hospitals, QUEENS CHRON., Sept. 22,
2006 (noting that SQUISH had "spoken with Health Department officials, and plans
to weigh in on the state approval process").
141. Lee Testimony, supra note 140.
142. Declaration of Irving Hicks 7, In re Saint Vincent's Catholic Med. Ctrs. of
N.Y., No. 05-14945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2006).
143. Declaration of Eduardo Barahona T 14, In re Saint Vincent's Catholic Med.
Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 05-14945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2006).
144. Craig Giammona, Mary Immac, St. John's Sold, JAMAICA TIMES LEDGER,
June 29, 2006 ("[W]hile the Department of Health has access to statistics, it often
lacks specific information about the communities hospitals serve.").
145. Karen Clements, Community Weighs in on Sale of Hospitals, QUEENS CHRON.,
Oct. 5, 2006.
146. Colin Gustafson, Hospitals' Sale Approved, but Concerns Linger, QUEENS
CHRON., Nov. 16, 2006.
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owner inherited substantial financial constraints, which resulted in
unexpected staff cuts, problems with cash flow, and questions
about possible mismanagement. 147 Despite the receipt of approxi-
mately $6 million in state funds,148 Mary Immaculate remains at
risk of closure, and the community continues to seek possible ave-
nues to influence the hospital's future.
B. Berger Commission "Recommendations"
In what is perhaps the antithesis of deliberative democracy, the
New York State Legislature created the Berger Commission in
2005, "charged with examining the supply of general hospital and
nursing home facilities,'149 and recommending changes that will re-
sult in a more coherent, streamlined health care system in the state
of New York." 150 The term "recommendations" is a misnomer: in
actuality, the Berger Commission's so-called recommendations au-
tomatically became law on January 1, 2007, without any action on
the part of the Legislature. 151 By the terms of the legislation creat-
ing the Berger Commission, both houses of the State Legislature
had only a one month window to review the Berger Commission's
231 page report 152 and reach a majority resolution rejecting the
"recommendations" in totality-all during the winter holiday sea-
son when the Legislature was not in general session. 153 Clearly, the
Legislature created the Berger Commission to make potentially
controversial decisions without having any accountability to their
own constituency. Thus, a state legislator could honestly say that
she or he never approved or voted for any of the Berger Commis-
sion's "recommendations."
In addition to its unprecedented lawmaking authority, the Ber-
ger Commission had several other fundamental flaws: none of the
147. See Pete Davis, Hospital Facing Staff Cuts, QUEENS COURIER, Mar. 1, 2007;
Craig Giammona, Mary Immac Cash Flow Problems Could Force Layoffs, Budget
Cuts, JAMAICA TIMES LEDGER, Mar. 1, 2007.
148. See Donald Bertrand, 2 Hosps Get 6M State Loan at Last Minute, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007, at 52; Craig Giammona, Ailing Mary Immac Receives State
Bailout, JAMAICA TIMES LEDGER, Mar. 29, 2007.
149. Although the Berger Commission addressed the supply of both hospitals and
nursing homes, this Article discusses the "recommendations" for hospital closures
only.
150. Commission on Health Care Facilities in the 21st Century, Enabling Legisla-
tion, pt. K, sec. 31, § 1, 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 193-202 (McKinney) [hereinafter Ena-
bling Legislation].
151. Id. § 9.
152. BERGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92.
153. Enabling Legislation, supra note 150, § 9.
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eighteen commission members were elected and, thus, not account-
able to the public-in fact, twelve of the eighteen were appointed
by former Governor George Pataki even though he left office
when the recommendations went into effect; 154 the state was di-
vided into six separate regions, and New York City was considered
one, single region despite having almost one-half of the state's pop-
ulation;155 although the Legislature provided a list of factors for
consideration, it gave no guidance as to the weight of each factor
and even authorized the Berger Commission to devise its own fac-
tors for consideration;156 the only opportunity for public comment
was in public hearings held before Regional Advisory Committees
("RACs") 5 7-not members of the Berger Commission-and the
hearings were not transcribed or taped in any manner; 5 8 and the
Berger Commission was not subject to New York's "Open Meet-
ings Law" 159 and, therefore, conducted most of its deliberations in
executive session beyond the purview of the public. 160
Until the recommendations were released on November 28,
2006,61 the general public could only speculate on which hospitals
were at risk of closure since the Berger Commission's discussions
154. Id. § 2. The Berger Commission's recommendations went into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2007, the same time Governor Pataki left office.
155. Id. § 7. David Sandman, Executive Director of the Berger Commission, noted
that New York City made up forty-two percent of New York State's population. See
COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, LONG ISLAND, NEW
YORK CITY AND NORTHERN REGIONAL OVERVIEWS 4 (May 11, 2006), http://www.ny
healthcarecommission.org/docs/2006-05-1 1_regional-overviews-presentation.pdf
[hereinafter REGIONAL OVERVIEW] .
156. Enabling Legislation, supra note 150, § 5.
157. A "Regional Advisory Committee" consisted of appointed members who were
charged with the development of "recommendations for reconfiguring its region's
general hospital and nursing home bed supply to align bed supply with regional and
local needs." Id. § 7(d). Although each RAC was required to submit recommenda-
tions to the entire Berger Commission, there was no equivalent requirement for the
Berger Commission to consider those recommendations or explain its rejection of
them. Id.
158. This is based on my personal observations at the RAC public hearings held in
New York City and my office's effort to obtain a transcript of the proceedings. I was
informed that no such transcript exists. The Berger Commission itself was not re-
quired to receive public comment from community members about its work. Id.
§§ 7(d), 8(a).
159. The Open Meetings Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 et seq., includes stringent
requirements to ensure that the activities of public bodies are transparent and open to
the public. For example, the public must be notified of meetings, which can go into
executive session only under limited circumstances. Id. § 105.
160. Enabling Legislation, supra note 150, § 6.
161. See generally BERGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92.
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about hospitals took place behind closed doors.162 Thus local re-
sidents and community groups were not able to prepare before-
hand for an announcement that their neighborhood hospital was
subject to mandatory closure. Overall, the Berger Commission
recommended the closure of nine hospitals throughout New York
State-five of them were in New York City even though the occu-
pancy rates of New York City's hospitals were higher than the state
average. 163  Moreover, New York City's projected population
growth far exceeded the state average. Indeed, it is the only region
in the state where population is increasing, which raises questions
of whether more hospitals would be needed in the future.1 64 By the
Berger Commission's own estimate, it would cost the health care
system $1.2 billion to implement its recommendations. 165
The structure of the Berger Commission's work made it impossi-
ble to scrutinize the accuracy of its findings before they attained
the force of law. Shortly after the release of the Berger Commis-
sion's recommendations, the New York City Comptroller raised
concerns about the availability of emergency rooms should those
five hospitals close-an issue that was never openly addressed by
the Berger Commission. 166 At least one hospital has argued that
162. See Jacob Gershman, Closing Six Hospitals to Be Sought in the City, N.Y. SUN,
Nov. 22, 2006 at 1; Jordan Lite, Hosps on Critical List, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 20,
2006, at 10; Owen Moritz & Jordan Lite, Hospitals on Dead List, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 23, 2006 at 46; Richard Pfrez-Pefia, No Clues Yet as Health Industry Awaits a
Report on Downsizing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006, at B1; Gail Scott, A Dozen City
Hospitals May Have to Close, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Nov. 20, 2006, at 1.
163. According to the Berger Commission, the occupancy rate of New York City's
hospitals was 68.6% (compared to the state average of 65.3%) for licensed beds and
83.5% (compared to the state average of 77.6%) for available beds. BERGER COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 50.
164. REGIONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 155, at 6. In fact, the New York City Re-
gional Advisory Committee, which made non-binding recommendations to the Ber-
ger Commission regarding New York City's hospital capacity, found that the "bed
capacity is about right for current utilization in New York City" and recommended
the reduction of only "paper"-or unstaffed-beds. COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE FA-
CILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, NEW YORK CITY REGIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2006) [hereinafter RAC REPORT], available at http://www.ny
healthcarecommission.org/docs/final/appendix2-newyorkcityrac.pdf (capitalizations
modified).
165. BERGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 17.
166. WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, JR., OFFICE OF THE N.Y. CITY COMPTROLLER, EMER-
GENCY CARE: WILL IT BE THERE? ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CLOSING FIVE EMER-
GENCY ROOMS IN NEW YORK CITY (Dec. 2006). A subsequent study by the
Cambridge Health Alliance and Harvard Medical School proves that these concerns
are well founded. Emergency room visits nationwide increased by 18-26% between
1994 and 2004 while the number of emergency departments decreased by 9-12% dur-
ing the same time period. Andrew P. Wilper et al., Waits to See an Emergency Depart-
ment Physician: U.S. Trends and Predictors, 1997-2004, 27 HEALTH AFm. w84 (2008).
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the Berger Commission relied on inaccurate data, which it never
had the opportunity to correct because there was no process to vet
the findings.167 Moreover, prominent public health scholars have
discredited the underlying principle behind the Berger Commis-
sion's drive to close hospitals. 168 This principle called "Roemer's
law" claims that unnecessary hospital admissions increase if there
are more available beds. 16 9 Perhaps most disturbingly, the Berger
Commission cited to a single study for the proposition that "hospi-
tal closures have a modest effect on access to care in urban ar-
eas." 170 That study actually found that "[i]ncreased distance to the
closest hospital increases deaths from heart attacks and uninten-
tional injuries" 171 and that "the effect of closures [are expected] to
be greatest on seniors and low-income patients."'1 72
This Article has no intention of debating whether the Berger
Commission was correct in its analysis and recommendations.
Rather, the key issue is the complete absence of an open, delibera-
As a consequence, the wait time to see a physician in the emergency department
increased from a median of 22 minutes in 1997 to 30 minutes in 2004. Id. at w87-w88.
These wait times were disproportionately longer for black and Hispanic patients (31
minutes for black patients and 33 minutes for Hispanic patients, compared to only 24
minutes for white patients). Id.
167. This hospital claimed that the Berger Commission underestimated its outpa-
tient visits by 25% and overestimated its long-term debt by 39%. See Complaint at
10, Albert Lindley Lee Mem'l Hosp. v. Comm'r of the N.Y. State Dep't of Health et
al., No. 07-0509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oswego County Mar. 8, 2007).
168. Professors Alan Sager and Deborah Socolar, Directors of the Health Reform
Program at Boston University School of Public Health, cite to a study by the United
States General Accounting Office that found "only a weak relation between bed ca-
pacity and volume of use of hospital care." ALAN SAGER & DEBORAH SOCOLAR,
HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM, BOSTON UNIV. SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH, CLOSING
HOSPITALS WON'T SAVE MONEY BUT WILL HARM ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (2006).
169. BERGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 56.
170. Id. at 61.
171. Thomas C. Buchmueller et al., How Far to the Hospital? The Effect of Hospi-
tal Closures on Access to Care, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 740, 740 (2005).
172. Id. at 743. Just prior to the release of the Berger Commission's final recom-
mendations, the Primary Care Development Corporation and the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation predicted that hospital closures would have a simi-
lar impact on low-income New Yorkers because of their greater reliance on hospitals
for their primary care services. NANCY LAGER ET AL., PRIMARY CARE DEV. CORP. &
THE N.Y. CITY HEALTH & Hosps. CORPS., A PRIMARY CARE CAPACITY SHORTAGE
IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CLOSURES 2 (2006).
In fact, they found that "[low-income New Yorkers are twice as reliant as New
Yorkers as a whole on hospitals as their source for primary care." Id. at 10. Another
report issued more recently by the Cambridge Health Alliance and Harvard Medical
School has found wait times in urban emergency departments to be double the wait
times in non-urban areas, further evidencing the vulnerabilities of urban communities
to hospital closures, particularly for emergency conditions such as accidents and heart
attacks. Wilper et al., supra note 166, at w88.
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tive process by which individuals could challenge the commission's
findings and ensure that they are, in fact, the best determinations.
Essentially, the Berger Commission's structure and process were
inherently antithetical to the civic republican principles of delibera-
tion, equality, universalism, and citizenship. This is particularly
troubling in the area of health care, where decisions-such as the
closure of a neighborhood hospital-can have a tremendous im-
pact on the lives of thousands of individuals.
Despite being shut out of the decisionmaking process, some
communities have challenged the Berger Commission's recommen-
dations. This Article discusses the efforts of two such communities:
residents in the Northeast Bronx and Southwest Brooklyn, who are
battling to preserve the services of two hospitals slated for closure
by the Berger Commission. Yet again, community members are
taking action as they fight to insert themselves into the public de-
bate about their local health care in an effort to make the princi-
ples of civic republicanism a part of the State's health care
policymaking.
1. Mandated Closure of New York Westchester Square Medical
Center in the Northeast Bronx
The announcement that the Berger Commission had chosen to
close New York Westchester Square Medical Center came as some-
thing of a surprise. The New York City Regional Advisory Com-
mittee, the local body that made non-binding recommendations to
the Berger Commission, found that Westchester Square is "finan-
cially sound" and the "lowest cost hospital in the Bronx." '73 The
Regional Advisory Committee further found that the hospital is "a
high quality provider" and the "number one choice of [neighbor-
ing] community residents," serving a "primary service area [that]
includes parts of ... neighborhoods which are 'stressed' and 'seri-
ous shortage areas' for primary care." '174 When making its final de-
terminations, the Berger Commission made no effort to explain
why it decided to reject the Regional Advisory Committee's rec-
ommendations and close Westchester Square, instead of other
more financially distressed hospitals.
In essence, the Berger Commission members, who had no partic-
ular ties or accountability to the Northeast Bronx community
served by Westchester Square, were authorized by the State to
173. RAC REPORT, supra note 164, at 12.
174. Id.
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make an important decision about the community's health care
without consulting the people affected by those decisions. Had the
Commission sought information from community members them-
selves, it may have reached a different and far better conclusion.
For example, the next closest hospital has wait times of up to nine
to twelve hours in its emergency room for patients with serious ill-
nesses, such as cancer and kidney failure. 75 Several area nursing
homes relied upon Westchester Square for emergency medical
care, which was crucial for elderly residents with life threatening
conditions, such as strokes and pneumonia. 76 Furthermore, the
hospital's patients and staff truly thought of Westchester Square as
a "community hospital." Many of the nurses, in fact, had been
born at Westchester Square and spent their entire nursing careers
(up to thirty-three years) working there.177
On January 3, 2007, NYLPI, in conjunction with pro bono coun-
sel Chadbourne & Parke, filed a lawsuit on behalf of some of the
community members who were concerned about the imminent clo-
sure of Westchester Square. 78 The clients, Mary McKinney and
the members of Mechler Hall Senior Center, used Westchester
Square for decades and were concerned about their access to care,
especially emergency medical care, should the hospital be forced to
shut down. Mary McKinney, a sixty-four-year old cancer survivor,
suffered from severe asthma, erratic blood pressure, and debilitat-
ing arthritis.179 In the prior ten years, McKinney had gone to West-
chester Square more than four times due to asthma attacks, blood
175. See Affidavit of Hannah Acampora $$ 3-7, 9-10, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y.
State Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 24, 2007); Affi-
davit of Winifred Kirby, R.N., 78, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of
Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 25, 2007).
176. See Affidavit of George Stops $1 5-6, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State
Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 23, 2007); Affidavit of
Alexander Stern (Kings Harbor Multicare Center) 7, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y.
State Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 23, 2007).
177. See Affidavit of Mary McNulty $ 2, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't
of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 24, 2007); Affidavit of Col-
leen Molloy $ 2, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 24, 2007); Affidavit of Jeanette Torres 2, McKin-
ney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx
County Jan. 25, 2007).
178. See Michael Clancy, Hospitals Get Judge's Reprieve, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4, 2007, at
A18; Dean Meminger, Judge Signs Temporary Restraining Order on Hospital Closing,
NY1 NEWS, Jan. 3, 2007, http://www.nyl.com/nyl/content/index.jsp?&aid=65613&
searchresult=l&stid=19.
179. Affidavit of Mary McKinney in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order 1, McKinney v. Comm'r of
N.Y. State Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Dec. 30, 2006).
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clots requiring surgery, and dangerously high blood pressure.1 °
Her travel time to the next nearest hospitals would have doubled,
causing particular concern since time is of the essence during an
asthma attack. 181 Likewise, several of the members of Mechler
Hall Senior Center would suffer from the loss of Westchester
Square's services. One member, Anthony Ortiz, was becoming
progressively blind in addition to other numerous health
problems.182 In 2006 alone, Ortiz had been hospitalized four times
at Westchester Square, his preferred hospital. 183 One hospital that
the Berger Commission found to be an adequate substitute for
Westchester Square was not an option for him. Ortiz had previ-
ously been left on a stretcher for three days in that hospital be-
cause it was so overcrowded and he refused to go there again?8 4
The Berger Commission, of course, had none of this information
when it reached its decision to close Westchester Square.
The legal basis of the lawsuit was that the legislature delegated
its lawmaking authority to an unelected commission in violation of
the New York State Constitution's separation of powers.1 8 5 What
that meant in real terms is that the Legislature removed the closure
of hospitals from the democratic process so that citizens, like Mc-
Kinney and Ortiz, had no one to turn to with their concerns. This
outcome is contrary to the state constitutional mandate that only
the Legislature, which is politically accountable to its electorate,
could actually make law. Our clients could not go to the State De-
partment of Health because it was statutorily required to follow
the law, nor could they go to their state elected officials, who
played no part in the hospital closing decisions. They could not
even go to the Berger Commission because it dissolved after the
completion of its work. The entire decisionmaking process under
the Berger Commission was fashioned specifically to ensure that
there would be no accountability to local residents for decisions of
great importance in their lives.
180. Id. $ 9.
181. Id. TT 13-14.
182. Affidavit of Deacon Dhoel Canals in Support of Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order 10, McKinney v.
Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health, No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan.
2, 2007).
183. Id. 11.
184. Id. 91 12.
185. Verified Complaint 1, McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health,
No. 6034/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 3, 2007).
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Although our clients initially obtained a Temporary Restraining
Order to stop the closure of Westchester Square, their case was
eventually dismissed because the court found that the Legislature
delegated a "reasonable amount of discretion" with sufficient
guidelines that had been necessarily general "due to the complex-
ity" of streamlining New York's health care system. 186 Leaving
aside the state constitutional question of whether the Berger Com-
mission's unfettered discretion to pick and choose hospitals for clo-
sure-based on considerations of its own making-can properly be
called "sufficient" legislative guidelines, the court's reasoning has
tremendous implications with respect to the community's ability to
influence public policy and hold their elected officials accountable.
The court made the explicit point that the "complexity of the task
involved" required the Berger Commission to be "accorded
greater flexibility in resolving" the issues with its "specialized ex-
pertise.' 1 87 Yet, the court's reasoning negates the value of a differ-
ent sort of expertise-localized knowledge and experiences-that
are equally important to issues of public concern. Furthermore,
the logic of the court's decision inescapably leads to the dis-
empowerment of communities as their lives become more "com-
plex" and therefore vulnerable to the discretions and greater
"flexibility" of the so-called "experts" in unelected bodies.
2. Mandated Closure of Victory Memorial Hospital
in Southwest Brooklyn
Victory Memorial Hospital filed for bankruptcy approximately
two weeks before the Berger Commission issued its recommenda-
tions.188 Thus, it came as no surprise when the hospital, located in
the Southwest area of Brooklyn, was ultimately slated for clo-
sure.' 89 As with Westchester Square, the Berger Commission
reached its decisions without fully understanding the repercussions
to the neighboring community, especially the large immigrant com-
munities that relied on Victory Memorial's culturally competent
care. Also similar to Westchester Square was the recommendation
of the New York City Regional Advisory Committee that Victory
Memorial remain open, in this case because of its linguistic and
186. McKinney v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 836 N.Y.S.2d 794, 805
(Sup. Ct. 2007), affd, 840 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 2007), appeal denied, 848 N.Y.S.2d
26 (2007) (table decision).
187. Id. at 14.
188. Matthew Chayes, Hospital's Bankruptcy Filing Precedes Report on Closure,
N.Y. SUN, Nov. 17, 2006 at 3.
189. BERGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 151.
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culturally competent care for the Muslim and Chinese communities
and its service to the Bensonhurst-Bay Ridge community that faces
"serious shortages in primary care."' 90 Cultural competency was of
particular importance for the larger Arab community that lives
near Victory Memorial, which hired an Arab community outreach
coordinator, set up a masjit (prayer area) for its Muslim patients,
and had contracts with several Arab-American physicians.1 91
The neighborhood of Bay Ridge-Bensonhurst in Southwest
Brooklyn is the largest immigrant neighborhood in Brooklyn and
the fourth largest citywide, with a population of 78,600 immi-
grants. 192 Over forty percent of the residents in Southwest Brook-
lyn are foreign-born, and one-half of all residents speak a language
other than English at home.193 Additionally, 34,000 residents-one
out of every six-are sixty-five years or older, a population that is
particularly susceptible to health conditions requiring hospital
care. 194 The New York City Regional Advisory Committee further
noted that Victory Memorial was "one of the major providers in
Bensonhurst-Bay Ridge," accounting for half of all hospital admis-
sions for this community. 95 These facts indicate that the loss of
Victory Memorial could be devastating to the communities that it
serves, especially when that care is culturally competent and neigh-
boring hospitals have wait times of seven to eight hours due to
overcapacity. 196
With the looming threat of Victory Memorial's closure, the Arab
and Muslim community in Southwest Brooklyn organized to form
the Concerned Residents of Southwest Brooklyn ("CRSB"). 19 7
190. RAC REPORT, supra note 164, at 14, 36.
191. Letter from Nisha Agarwal, Staff Attorney, N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. Inter-
est, to Richard F. Daines, Comm'r, N.Y. State Dep't of Health, app. C (Oct. 17, 2007).
(Statement of Habib Joudeh) (hereinafter Joudeh Statement] (on file with author) .
192. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW
YORKERS 2000: BRIEFING BOOKLET 15 (2004.
193. These percentages were taken from the 2000 census for zip codes 11209, 11228,
and 11214 that comprise Southwest Brooklyn. This information can be found in the
"Population Finder" at http://www.census.gov/.
194. This information was taken from the 2000 census for zip codes 11209, 11228,
and 11214 in the "Population Finder" at http://www.census.gov/.
195. RAC REPORT, supra note 164, at 14.
196. Letter from Nisha Agarwal, Staff Attorney, N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. Inter-
est, to Richard F. Daines, Comm'r, N.Y. State Dep't of Health, app. B (Oct. 17, 2007)
(Statement of Dr. Faiz Alzoobaee) (on file with author).
197. The Concerned Residents of Southwest Brooklyn include Sakibeh Mustafa,
Victory Memorial's Community Outreach Coordinator, Salam Arabic Church, the
Arab American Association of New York, the United American Muslim Association
of New York, the Council of People's Organizations, and the Arab Muslim American
Federation. Id.
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Having experienced retaliations from the September 11th terrorist
attacks, many of CRSB's members had already engaged in commu-
nity activism and became leaders of their community.' 98 When
CRSB members learned of Victory Memorial's mandated closure,
they took a similar activist stance through participation in vigils
and rallies and meeting with public officials and Victory Memo-
rial's executives to ensure their concerns were heard. 199 CRSB also
submitted information to the State Department of Health in sup-
port of a proposal to sell Victory Memorial to another Brooklyn
hospital that planned on preserving critical health services in the
Southwest Brooklyn community.200
In the civic republican tradition, CRSB's goal was to influence
key decisionmakers in the State Department of Health and Victory
Memorial with information that had been gathered from the com-
munity. CRSB's participation in the deliberative process, however,
resulted from its own initiative despite resistance from both the
State and the hospital. Victory Memorial repeatedly failed to share
timely information with community members, and most recently
terminated its labor and delivery services just four days before
Christmas and nearly two weeks ahead of schedule.2 0 ' Addition-
ally, the State Department of Health rejected the proposal to sell
Victory Memorial, and then placed the burden on CRSB, a coali-
tion of local residents, to come up with a financial plan to save the
hospital. Rather than calling upon the community for the expertise
that they had (for example, the utilization of Victory Memorial's
services, the specific cultural competency needs, and the barriers to
seek care elsewhere), the State asked the community to devise a
plan to preserve critical services where they were needed, a task
that the State itself should be required to perform.
The campaign to save Victory Memorial is emblematic of the
larger problem of "burdens" caused by the exclusion of community
members from the deliberative process. Despite the activism of
CRSB, the coalition faced an uphill battle in mobilizing a commu-
nity that was already disheartened by the announcement of Victory
Memorial's imminent closure. The burden of reversing a decision
198. Joudeh Statement, supra note 191.
199. Letter from Nisha Agarwal, Staff Attorney, N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. Inter-
est, to Richard F. Daines, Comm'r, N.Y. State Dep't of Health (Oct. 17, 2007) (on file
with author).
200. Id.
201. See Harold Egeln, After 107 Years, Victory Hospital's Maternity Ward Heads to
Fort Greene, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Dec. 28, 2007: Joyce Shelby & Rachel
Monahan, Bay Ridge Hospital Shuts Baby Unit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 21, 2007.
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to close a hospital is far greater than participating in a process
where a decision has yet to be made. Likewise, influencing the
Berger Commission's recommendations would necessarily be less
taxing and burdensome than attempting to fashion a way to save
some of the hospital's services within the constraints of the com-
mission-mandated closure. CRSB had the additional burden of
coming up with a financial plan for Victory Memorial and navigat-
ing the complex landscape of bankruptcy law and health care fi-
nancing-subject areas far beyond their expertise-because they
were more committed than either the hospital or the State in pre-
serving vital health services in the community.
CRSB's campaign to save Victory Memorial also illustrates the
crucial nature of the "equality principle" of civic republicanism.
Ironically, the community members of Southwest Brooklyn, which
had the greatest stake in Victory Memorial's health services, had to
force themselves into negotiations between the hospital and the
State Department of Health, which considered themselves the only
real decisionmakers. CRSB and other Southwest Brooklyn re-
sidents should instead be seen as equal partners in deciding what
health care resources are needed in their community. The guaran-
tee of such equality is especially important for groups like CRSB's
members, which are often silenced by the prejudice and discrimina-
tion that continues to pervade public discourse. The rampant anti-
Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments following the September 11th
terrorist attacks, for example, should be taken into consideration
when ensuring the equal participation of community members in
202 Prthe deliberative process. As Professor Matsuda so eloquently
stated, the inequities faced by CRSB's members, as well as the
other community groups and residents discussed in this Article,
cause them to "speak with a special voice to which we should lis-
ten" and place an even greater urgency to incorporate their con-
cerns in decisions affecting their local health care.20 3
202. The discrimination experienced by Arabs and Muslims has necessarily caused
some mistrust in how they are treated by both the government and private actors and
how they are depicted in the media. One example of the source of this mistrust can
be found in a blog responding to a New York Daily News article about Victory Memo-
rial, which commented, "Afeela Habooza and his wife can't get what they need, like a
female doctor and a special goat meat diet. Tough $hit. Go the f back to your country
so you can get what you so richly deserve." Comment by Byron (Dec 21, 2007
11:33:41 AM), in response to Joyce Shelby & Rachel Monahan, Bay Ridge Hospital
Shuts Baby Unit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://www.nydaily
news.com/ny-local/brooklyn/2007/12/21/2007-12-21-bay-ridge-hospital-shutsbaby-
unit.html.
203. See Matsuda, supra note 31, at 324.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to provide dual arguments-one the-
oretical, the other empirical-in support of greater community par-
ticipation and accountability in a comprehensive form of
community health planning. As civic republican scholars have con-
tended for over two decades, the principles of equal participation
in a deliberative process will not only promote feelings of commu-
nity and civic empowerment, but will also result in better decision-
making as a multiplicity of possible alternatives are subject to
scrutiny. Moreover, a deliberative process that incorporates the di-
verse voices of the entire community has more legitimacy and a
greater likelihood of success as potential conflicts and disagree-
ments are resolved within the decisionmaking process, rather than
after decisions have already been made by a few select individuals.
Key policymakers have already raised the need for health plan-
ning and important developments are currently in motion. In re-
marks made in New York City, the Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Health commented that the State might have
avoided the Berger Commission if there had been long-term health
planning in place. 04 The chair of the State Assembly's Health
Committee has included the reestablishment of a network of re-
gional planning agencies as part of his universal health care propo-
sal.2" 5 The Finger Lakes HSA-the only fully operational HSA in
New York State-co-sponsored a conference called "Avoiding the
Next Berger Commission: The Role- of Community Health Plan-
ning in New York State" with presentations by elected officials and
health policymakers in support of community health planning.
20 6
Finally, the New York City Council has commissioned a study of
community health planning for New York City, which is due to be
released in the summer of 2008.207
While the emerging interest in community health planning may
be laudable, a crucial question remains as to what form of commu-
nity participation and accountability will be included in health
204. Dr. Richard F. Daines, A Conversation with New York State Commissioner of
Health, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University
(Nov. 7, 2007).
205. RICHARD G. GOTTFRIED, CHAIR OF ASSEMBLY HEALTH COMM., NEW YORK
HEALTH PLUS: BETTER COVERAGE FOR ALL OF Us AT LOWER COST 13 (Dec. 2007).
206. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH & FINGER LAKES HEALTH SYS.
AGENCY, AVOIDING THE NEXT BERGER COMMISSION: THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY
HEALTH PLANNING IN NEW YORK STATE, CONFERENCE SUMMARY (2007), available
at http://www.cgr.org/docs/Full-conferenceSummary.pdf
207. Id. at 41-42.
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planning. The stories of CSOH, SQUISH, Mary McKinney,
Mechler Hall Senior Center, and CRSB demonstrate that commu-
nity input in health care decisionmaking is not merely an abstract
ideal of the democratic process, but a palpable need in the current
health care system. It is clear that some form of health care reform
will take place in the near future, but lawmakers must incorporate
long-term planning that is inclusive of community voices to ensure
the success of that reform. With or without the cooperation of gov-
ernment and the health care industry, community activists will con-
tinue to engage in a public dialogue about their local health care
resources. In fact, a newly formed, citywide coalition of health pol-
icy experts and grassroots community-based organizations are cur-
rently advocating for both state and city funds to bring community-
based health planning to New York City in a manner that ensures
community participation and accountability.208 The challenge for
state policymakers is to welcome that engagement in a manner that
is meaningful, productive, and institutionalized within the health
policymaking structure.
208. The members of the Coalition for Community Health Planning include Brin-
kerhoff Action Association, Bronx Health REACH, Brooklyn Perinatal Network,
Coalition for Asian American Children and Families, Center for Independence of the
Disabled NY, Commission on the Public's Health System, Community Health Care
Association of New York State, Concerned Residents Organization, Jamaica Neigh-
borhood Center, Joseph P. Addabbo Family Health Center, New York Immigration
Coalition, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, Opportunity Agenda, Primary
Care Development Corporation, and Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy.
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